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Calk: Implied Covenant of Development and Further Exploration - Dilemma

IMPLIED COVENANT OF DEVELOPMENT AND
FURTHER EXPLORATION-DILEMMA OR SOLUTION?
JAMES IRWIN CALK
-Implied covenants in oil and gas leases have been the subject of dispute
for decades. The typical oil and gas lease does not specifically enumerate
the duties or obligations of the lessee with respect to development and further
exploratory activity after initial production has been achieved on the leasehold. The reason for this is that despite technological advances which include new testing and data gathering equipment, the only positive way to locate producing formations is to drill a well. With this fact, plus innumerable
unforeseeable events which would delay or prevent a well from being completed, most lessees avoid clauses in leases which would require them to follow a certain pattern of development.
According to Professors Williams and Meyers, implied covenants in oil and
gas leases had their beginning in 1889.1 In that year the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Stoddard v. Emery,2 in which an express development
clause was the subject of litigation. In dictum the court stated that had there
been no express clause governing development,
[t]here would of course have arisen an implication that the property
should be reasonably developed and evidence of a custom of reasonable
development by boring a given number of wells in a certain
space of
3
time would have been competent and perhaps controlling.
Another concept instrumental in the origin of implied covenants in oil and
gas leases is the "principle of cooperation" found in contract law. 4 Williams
and Meyers have stated that this principle of cooperation "is based upon both
the reasonable expectations of the parties when they enter into an agreement
and ethical concepts of conduct."5 Since express terms are frequently omitted in leases, there must be cooperation on the part of lessor and lessee in
order to avoid needless litigation. The lessor is interested primarily in the
royalty income which is dependent on the lessee developing the property with
1. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 802, at 3 (1972).
2. 18 A. 339 (Pa. 1889).
3. Id. at 339. See also 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 802,
at 4 (1972).
4. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 802.1, at 8-11 (1972).
5. Id. § 802.1, at 8. Williams and Meyers cite the famous case of Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917) which illustrates the principle of cooperation in contract law where an exclusive selling agent was held to be bound by an implied promise to use due diligence in promoting the products in question, on which the
principal's consideration was founded. Id. § 802.1, at 9.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 7 [2022], No. 1, Art. 12

COMMENTS

1975]

due diligence so as to result in a profitable rate of return for both. The lessor
must not wrongfully prevent diligent development while, on the other hand,
the lessee is obligated to protect the leasehold from excess drainage and provide necessary marketing facilities. 6 Cooperation is of vital importance when
unforeseeable events occur which may require renegotiations, assignments,
unitization, or farmout agreements. When there is reasonable cooperation the
necessity of litigation is greatly reduced in the ordinary lessor-lessee relationship.

,

In order to distinguish between the implied covenants of development and
further exploration, it is helpful to analyze the harm resulting from the breach
of each covenant, and then to determine what remedies are adequate for such
a breach. Basically, there are three types of harm resulting from the failure
to fully develop a lease: (1) the failure to drill at all may leave untapped
oil that could be produced; (2) the failure to drill a sufficient number of
wells or a failure to drill in the right place may result in the permanent loss
of otherwise recoverable oil; and (3) a failure to drill a sufficient number
of wells may result in a slower rate of production which deprives the lessor
of the use of the capital represented by the unproduced royalty oil. 7 The
cause of action to remedy such harm is the failure to produce oil or gas from
a "known producing formation," or the failure to produce minerals from a
"known formation" at a proper rate. 8
Three remedies are recognized for the breach of the implied covenant to
develop. The harshest is unconditional cancellation of the entire lease except for a specified area around existing producing wells. 9 Second, the court
may issue a conditional decree of cancellation whereby the lessee must drill
a specified number of wells in the undeveloped portion of a known horizon,
or suffer cancellation as to such acreage. 10 Third, some courts have held that
the only appropriate remedy is damages, unless this remedy is clearly proven
inadequate." Where there has been a permanent loss of oil or gas from a
failure to develop, damages are measured either by the value of the royalty
on the oil or gas lost, or by the value of the royalty which would have been
due from the well if the lessor had drilled promptly. 1 2 If there is no per6. Id. § 802.1, at 10.
7. Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 553,
554 (1956). See also 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAw § 831, at 210210.1 (1972).
8. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 831, at 211 (1972).
9. E.g., Sparks v. Midstates Oil Corp., 251 F.2d 71 (10th Cir. 1958); Harris v.
Morris Plan Co., 61 P.2d 901 (Kan. 1936).
10. E.g., McMahan v. Boggess, 302 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1957).
11. E.g., W.T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 518, 19 S.W.2d
27, 29 (1929); Christie, Mitchell & Mitchell Co. v. Howell, 359 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
12. General Crude Oil Co. v. Harris, 101 S.W.2d 1098, 1102-03 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1937, writ dism'd).
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manent loss of oil or gas, it has been held the "royalty" rule would result
in a double recovery since production has been merely delayed, and the minerals are still in place.'1 Instead, a West Virginia court has defined the injury as the wrongful withholding from the lessor of the use of capital represented by the oil in place, and awarded the lessor the interest on the sum
of royalties which would have been paid had there been no breach. 14 The
Texas Supreme Court recognizes the problem where oil and gas is still in
place and recoverable; however, the court has refused to follow the "interest"
rule, holding that an equity court could relieve a lessee from the duty to pay
royalty on subsequently extracted minerals if the royalty has already been
paid due to the breach of the covenant to develop. 16
Unlike the development covenant, the further exploration covenant focuses
on potentially productive horizons which are not fully tested. While the major harm resulting from a breach of the development covenant is loss of capital represented by minerals otherwise recoverable, the major harm from the
breach of the further exploration covenant is that the lessor has been deprived
of the opportunity of having his mineral estate tested for new formations
which may be productive.' 6 Adequate remedies for the breach of the covenant of further exploration include absolute cancellation of the unexplored
mineral estate, either horizontally or vertically, or a conditional decree requiring the lessee to drill one or more exploratory wells in specified areas. 17
Damages are inadequate because the covenant concerns unproven horizons;
therefore, any estimate of the quantity of minerals in such horizons would
8
be too speculative to support a money judgment.'
One major problem which arises when a lessor claims a breach of the implied obligations relating to development or further exploration is the standard of conduct which should be imposed on the lessee. There are three
views on this standard-the duties are absolute; the duties are governed by
a test of good faith; or the duties are governed by the prudent operator standard.' 0 The view that the lessee's duties are absolute means that the operator is liable without fault and regardless of the reasonableness of his actions. 20
The test of good faith is that the operator's performance is measured by his
own subjective opinion, without regard to reasonableness. 21 Of course nei13. Grass v. Big Creek Dev. Co., 84 S.E. 750, 754 (W. Va. 1915).
14. Id. at 754.

15. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 438-39, 6 S.W.2d 1031,

1039 (1928). For further discussion of remedies for the breach of the implied covenant
to develop, see 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 834, at 237-46
(1972).
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS,
Id. § 841, at 260.
Id. § 844.3, at 330.
Id. § 806, at 29.
Id. § 806.1, at 29-30.
Id. § 806.2, at 30-31.

OIL AND GAS LAW
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ther of these standards meet the requirements of the principle of cooperation
and therefore do not complement the origin of implied covenants.
The majority of jurisdictions follows the third view, the prudent operator
standard, in testing a lessee's performance. 22 In the landmark case of Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 28 Judge Van Devanter brought the implied covenant
of development to life and adopted the "reasonable prudent operator" rule
as the standard by which to measure the alleged breach:
The object of the operations being to obtain a benefit or profit for both
lessor and lessee, it seems obvious, in the absence of some stipulation
to that effect, that neither is made the arbiter of the extent to which
or the diligence with which the operations shall proceed, and that both
are bound by the standard of what is reasonable. .

.

.

There can,

therefore, be a breach of the covenant for the exercise of reasonable
diligence, though the lessee be not guilty of fraud or bad faith.
But, while this is so, no breach can occur save where the absence of
such diligence is both certain and substantial in view of the actual circumstances at the time, as distinguished from mere expectations on the
part of mining enthusiasts. The large expenses incident to the work of
exploration and development, and the fact that the lessee must bear the
loss if the operations are not successful, require that he proceed with due
regard to his own interests, as well as those of the lessor. No obligation rests on him to carry the operations beyond the point where they
will be profitable to him, even if some benefit to the lessor will result
from them. It is only to the end that the oil and gas shall be extracted
with benefit or profit to both that reasonable diligence is required ...
Whatever, in the circumstances, would be reasonably expected of operaregard to the interests of both lessor
tors of ordinary prudence, having
24
and lessee, is what is required.
Based on this reasoning, the court held that the plaintiffs had stated a 25cause
of action for which cancellation of the lease was an appropriate remedy.
The facts in Brewster presented an ideal situation for the application of
an implied covenant to develop. The dilemma, especially in Texas, is
whether the implied covenants of development and further exploration should
be considered as two distinct and separate covenants which involve different
standards of conduct, or whether the duty to further explore is merely a part
of the general duty to reasonably develop the lease, requiring a lessee to act
only as a "reasonable prudent operator."
22. Id. § 806.3, at 35.
23. 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
24. Id. at 814 (emphasis added). In Brewster, the plaintiff-lessor sought to cancel
232.5 acres under lease for a failure to protect from drainage and to develop. The lease
had a primary term of 5 years and contained a "drill or pay rental" clause. The lessee
drilled one gas well 2 months before the primary term expired and 16 months later suit
was filed.
25. Id. at 820.
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ProfessorMeyers' Proposal
Professor Charles J. Meyers has been a leading proponent of the implied
covenant of further exploration. He first proposed the covenant in a law review article in 1956 in which his thesis was that a new implied covenant
should be recognized, the covenant to use due diligence to explore further
which is separate and distinct from the covenant to develop. 2 6 Professor
Meyers hypothesized a typical situation where the implied covenant of further
exploration would apply:
A rancher executed a lease on 640 acres of land in 1930. In 1932, oil
production was obtained in the northeast quarter section. Four wells were
drilled, the first three producers and the fourth, in the southwest quarter
of the quarter section, a dry hole. No other wells were drilled. In 1956
production totals sixty barrels daily from all three wells. But in 1955
another and deeper producing formation was discovered by a well located two miles to the southwest of the southern boundary of the lease.
The rancher
demands further exploratory drilling on his land. Should
27
he get it?
The answer to this would be in the affirmative based on a breach of the covenant to further explore. Meyers' reasoning was that the reasonable prudent
operator standard differs in "further exploration" cases as distinguished from
"development" cases, in that what a reasonable man may do about drilling
additional wells in proven formations has little bearing on what the same reasonable man would do about drilling exploratory wells to discover new mineral deposits in deeper sands. 28 In other words, a reasonable prudent operator will not drill additional development wells unless there is a [reasonable
expectation of profit after deducting all drilling and operating costs. An
operator usually can determine whether a development well will produce in
paying quantities since geological data may be collected from a known, proven
horizon. On the other hand, an exploratory well involves speculation based
more heavily on the general geophysical features of the area. Meyers asserts
that because the harm resulting from a failure to explore is different from
that resulting from the failure to develop, the lessor need not show that an
exploratory well will yield a reasonable profit. 29 Instead, it is proposed that
the lessor must show only that under all the circumstances the failure to drill
30
one or more exploratory wells in unproven formations is unreasonable.
Circumstances which would be relevant in such an inquiry are (1) the period
26. Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 553,
557 (1956). See also Meyers, The Covenant of Further Exploration: A Comment, 37

TEXAS L. REV. 179 (1958).
27. Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 553,

555 (1956).
28. Id. at 557.
29. Id. at 557. See also 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 841,
at 259 (1972).
30. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 841, at 259 (1972).
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of time that has elapsed since the last well was drilled, (2) the size of the
lease, (3) drilling operations on adjoining tracts, (4) the existence of untested horizons, (5) the lessee's intentions toward further exploration and his
operations on other leases, (6) the economic feasibility of further exploratory
drilling, and (7) whether a portion of the leasehold is executed from a production unit, so that such acreage is being held without any drilling.3 '
Although this list of circumstances is not exhaustive, it illustrates a few factors courts would consider in determining whether a lessee's action has been
so unreasonable as to warrant cancellation or conditional cancellation of the
2
unexplored acreage.a
Interpretationby the United States Supreme Court
In 1934, the Supreme Court decided the leading case of Sauder v. MidContinent Petroleum Corp.33 The plaintiff executed a lease to the defendant
in 1916 for a primary term of 10 years on the east one-half of a section of
land, and on the southeast quarter of the southwest quarter of the same section. The total area covered by the lease was 360 acres. In November of
1921, and in January 1922, the defendant drilled two offset wells; no other
wells had been drilled when suit was filed on June 27, 1930, 17 years after
the second well had been completed. Plaintiff asserted that production on
adjacent tracts was causing drainage of oil and gas from the leased land, that
the defendant was bound to explore and develop the land and had neglected
to do so, and that unless the lease was cancelled, the defendant would continue to hold it for speculative purposes only.3 4 Several factors were relevant
to the inquiry into the alleged breach. First, there was evidence of upper
and lower sands in the area, and there were wells in the lower sand to the
west and south of plaintiff's land. Second, the defendant produced expert
testimony to the effect that a reasonable prudent operator would not drill adtional wells On the Sauder tract because of the unlikelihood of obtaining oil
or gas from the lower sands. Third, it was the defendant's express intention
that no further exploration or development would commence until development in the immediate vicinity should convince them that it would "pay" to
take such action.
After considering other applicable decisions, including Brewster, and recognizing the generally accepted prudent operator standard, the Court held the
31. Id. § 841, at 259-60.

32. See the following articles for arguments opposing Professor Meyers' theory:
Boone, Implied Covenant for Additional Development, 31 Miss. L.J. 34 (1959); Brown,
The Proposed New Covenant of Further Exploration: Reply to Comment, 37 TEXAs
L. REV. 303 (1959); Galvin, Meyers v. Brown-Jurisprudence in Action, 7 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 589 (1960); Smith, The Implied Duty to Explore Further: Recent Texas Developments-A Disagreement, 42 TExAs L. REV. 199 (1963).
33. 292 U.S. 272 (1934).

34. Id. at 275-76.
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plaintiffs were entitled to cancellation of the lease to the untested half-section
of land unless an exploratory well was drilled.35 The Court distinguished
past cases which followed Brewster by reasoning that "[i]n none of them was
there neglect to explore or develop for any such period as is here shown, or
an expressed intention not to do so, in a comparable situation.

36

It was

noted that such an express intention not to further explore or develop the
lease did not comport with the obligation to prosecute development with due
37
regard to the interests of the lessor.
The production of oil on a small portion of the leased tract cannot
justify the lessee's holding the balance indefinitely and depriving the
lessor not only of the expected royalty from production pursuant to the
lease, but of the privilege of making some other
arrangement for avail8
ing himself of the mineral content of the land.A
Professor Meyers has interpreted his language as supportive of the implied
covenant of further exploration, especially in light of the Court's order of cancellation, made despite testimony that a prudent operator probably would decline to drill additional wells, whether exploratory or developmental in nature.3

9

It is also arguable, however, that the Court did not actually consider

the duty to explore as a separate and distinct covenant from that of development. The issue stated was "whether the respondent failed to comply with
an implied covenant to develop the tract with reasonable diligence. '40 Perhaps the Court was merely considering "all" relevant circumstances from
which it concluded that the lessee had failed to reasonably develop the lease,
thereby extending the holding of Brewster to include not only "development"
wells, but also "exploratory" wells which a diligent operator should be obligated to drill in order to give due regard to the lessor's interests.
THE DILEMMA IN TEXAS

A discussion of Texas law concerning the implied covenants of develop-

ment and further exploration should begin with Willingham v. Bryson,41 de-

cided in 1956 by the Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals.

The suit was to

35. Id. at 281.
36. Id. at 281 (emphasis added).

37. Id. at 281.
38. Id. at 281.
39. Meyers,

The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration: A

Comment, 37

L. REV. 179, 180 (1958).
40. Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 292 U.S. 272, 278 (1934) (emphasis
added).
TEXAS

41. 294 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1956, no writ). Prior to Willingham, the only Texas decision which could arguably support the covenant of further

exploration is Perkins v. Mitchell, 153 Tex. 368, 370-71, 268 S.W.2d 907, 909 (1954).
For an argument alleging that Perkins supports the covenant, see Meyers, The Covenant
of Further Exploration, 34 TExAs L. REv. 553, 577-81 (1956). Contra, Brown, The
Proposed New Covenant of FurtherExploration: Reply to Comment, 37 TEXAS L. REV.,
303, 324 (1959).
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cancel a lease for the failure to "further explore" known horizons, and the
court expressly adopted Professor Meyers' proposal that an implied covenant
to "explore" as distinguished from the covenant to "develop" should be recognized. 4 2 It was held that a covenant to further explore exists in oil and gas
leases, and the standard for determining breach is the prudent operator
rule.43 To prove a breach, however, the lessor was not required to show that
additional drilling would probably result in a profit to the lessee. 4 4 It was
shown that no wells had been drilled on the lease since the discovery of one
producing gas well. This, coupled with testimony from another operator that
he would have drilled an exploratory well to the lower zone in question,
45
satisfied the requirement.
This support for the covenant did not seem to last very long since Willingham was criticized in the landmark case of Clifton v. Koontz. 46 Clifton involved a suit to cancel a lease covering 350 acres, excepting 40 acres around
an existing well, on the theory that the owners of the working interest had
breached an implied covenant to reasonably develop the property and to
"reasonably explore the same for the production of minerals therefrom. '47
Clifton sought a conditional decree requiring the lessor to either commence
and continue the drilling of wells to a depth sufficient to "test all known horizons" in the general area, or forfeit all rights under the lease (except the
40 acres around an existing well). 48 The lease was executed in 1940 containing a 10-year primary term. In 1949 a well was drilled which produced
gas but very little oil. After acidizing this well proved unsuccessful, it
was "sand fractured" which significantly increased production. In addition, an operator who had drilled a producing oil and gas well on adjoining property, 1200 feet north of the north line of the Clifton tract, was willing to drill additional wells on the Clifton lease and contracted to do so if
a release or cancellation could be obtained. Evidence indicated two lower
formations other than the Morris field from which the one gas well was producing, but the nearest well producing from such formations was 21/2 miles
east of the Clifton tract and there was no evidence of lower sands on the
Clifton tract capable of production in paying quantities. Finally, the one gas
well on the 350-acre tract was producing the maximum allowable under the
Railroad Commission's regulations; therefore, even if an additional well had
been drilled to the Morris sand, the total allowable for the two wells would
have been no greater than the allowable for a single well.
42. Willingham v. Bryson, 294 S.W.2d 421, 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1956,
no writ).
43. Id. at 425.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 425.
Id. at 425.
160 Tex. 82, 97, 325 S.W.2d 684, 696 (1959).
Id. at 84, 325 S.W.2d at 687.
Id. at 84, 325 S.W.2d at 687.
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Based on these circumstances, the court held the lessee had not breached
the implied covenant to reasonably "develop" the lease:
While it is true that each separate stratum or horizon would be entitled to separate development, yet it is equally true that the burden rests
upon the lessor to prove that the producing stratum required additional
wells, or that strata different from that from which production is being
obtained, in reasonable probability exist, and that by the drilling of additional49 wells there would be a reasonable expectation of profit to the
lessee.
The court also refused to recognize the covenant to further explore and therefore held there was no breach. 50 Clifton had relied exclusively on the Willingham decision to support her contention that there was a distinction between development and exploration. The court denied that Willingham was
authoritative, explaining that an examination of Texas cases indicated that
the covenant of development includes all additional drilling requirements
once production is obtained. 51 Instead, it was held that there is no implied
covenant to explore distinguishable from the covenant to conduct additional2
development after production in paying quantities has been obtained."
Thus the court expressly rejected Meyers' theory on the basis that an expectation of profit is an essential element of the prudent operator rule.5 5
Examining this holding alone, one would encounter no difficulty in concluding that the court unqualifiedly rejected the concept of an obligation to
further explore a lease under any circumstances. However, there is very important dictum in the opinion which indicates the court might have granted
relief to Clifton if the facts had been different:
However, it should be noted that we do not have a factual situation
where the lease covers several thousand acres and an effort is being
made to hold such vast acreage by showing production from a comparatively small area. Neither are we confronted with a situation where an
unreasonably long length of time has elapsed since the last development
of the5 4leased premises. Therefore, we do not pass upon these questions.
This language presents the immediate question of whether the Texas Supreme Court might uphold an alleged breach of the obligation to further explore under the guise or label of the covenant to reasonably develop the leasehold. The second question naturally follows: under what standard of con49. Id. at 96, 325 S.W.2d at 695. This holding of the court was based mainly
on the "reasonable prudent operator rule" announced by Brewster which was cited by
the court.
50. Id. at 97-98, 325 S.W.2d at 696-97.
51. Id. at 97, 325 S.W.2d at 696. Note that the court's statement here did not
eliminate exploration as being encompassed by the term "development."
52. Id. at 97, 325 S.W.2d at 696.
53. Id. at 98, 325 S.W.2d at 697.
54. Id. at 97, 325 S.W.2d at 696. For a discussion of the Cliiton case see 5 H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAw § 845.6, at 350-58 (1972).
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duct would a lessee be bound in such circumstances? Finally, where there
has been such an unreasonable delay in development, would the lessor still
be faced with the burden of proving an expectation of profit before there
could be a breach? There has been no Texas Supreme Court decision which
answers these questions, but an analysis of subsequent Texas cases, plus an
examination of leading cases from other jurisdictions which have involved
similar issues provide a possible solution to this dilemma.
Shortly after Clifton, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided
Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Masterson,55 in which a conditional decree of cancellation for the failure to explore without a showing of the probability of
profit was affirmed. Masterson involved a suit to cancel the undeveloped
and unexplored portions of 31 leases covering "ninety thousand" acres, all of
which were executed before 1940 and contained short primary terms running
from 1 to 4 years. The oil and gas rights had been partitioned; the gas Tights
were owned by Colorado Gas Company, and the oil rights were owned by
Sinclair. Colorado had fully explored and developed the leases for gas by
drilling 114 wells, but prior to the institution of suit on June 16, 1955 Sinclair had not drilled a single oil well on the Masterson land. lIt was not the
practice for the gas lessee to drill to a depth sufficient to test the oil horizon
which existed around sea level; however, the only two gas wells drilled to
this depth did encounter oil shows. After suit was filed, Sinclair drilled 8
wells, 6 of which were producers and 7 of which were in a limited area
around the discovery well. The lower court rejected Sinclair's contention that
the lease had been fully developed by Colorado, holding that Sinclair's obligations to explore and develop were independent of those resting on Colorado. 5 Based on the probability of production from the undeveloped portions of the lease, the fact that Sinclair had inadequately explored the land
before and after suit was filed, the enormous acreage involved, and the long
delay in drilling over 25 years, the plaintiffs were granted a conditional decree. 5 7 This decree required Sinclair to drill 30 exploratory wells within a
5-year period, or one well within each 3,000 acres on the lease.5 8
Since federal courts are bound by the substantive laws of a state, 59 Sinclair
was permitted to file a supplemental brief contending that Clifton, which was
decided after the district court's decision, required a reversal because the
"plaintiffs failed to sustain the burden of proving that further exploration or
development would result in a profit to the lessee." 60 The court referred to
language in Clifton in which the Texas Supreme Court had recognized that
55. 271 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 952, rehearing denied, 363
U.S. 809 (1960).
56. Id. at 315.
57. Id. at 315.
58. Id.
59. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
60. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Masterson, 271 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1959).
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the factual situation did not involve a vast amount of acreage or that there
had been an unreasonable delay in further development, 6 1 stating that
"[t]hese words of caution could not have furnished a surer guide for interpretation of its language if they had been used with the case now before us
in mind."'6 2 In rejecting Sinclair's request for a reversal in light of Clifton
the court held that exploration on one portion of the lease would not nullify
the obligation to explore other parts; Clifton did not stand for the principle
that "under all circumstances exploration, accompanied or unaccompanied by
production of a portion of a lease, satisfies completely the implied covenants
of exploration-development. 63 Clifton was distinguished on the grounds that
the Texas Supreme Court had merely affirmed the trial court's findings that
the undeveloped acreage in question probably would not produce oil, and that
no profit would accompany other gas wells under the regulations of the Texas
Railroad Commission.6 4 Further, the facts in Masterson were held to be
clearly within the ambit of the Sauder case decided by the United States Supreme Court. 65
The next Texas decision dealing with the dilemma was Felmont Oil Corp.
v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.6 6 which at first glance appeared to have

rejected Masterson. Suit was brought on the theory that the lessees had
breached the covenant of further exploration in two leases. The lessees had
drilled 80 wells on a 5,685 acre tract, and 235 wells on a 13,352 acre tract.
Extensive geological surveys had been conducted on both tracts, and the lessees had contributed funds for testing the leases in question and on adjoining
land. A jury found that the lessees, or their predecessor in title, had drilled
or caused to be drilled as many exploratory wells below the depth of 3,200
feet on those portions of the lease owned by them as a reasonable, prudent
operator would have drilled under the same or similar circumstances.
It has been argued that the court's opinion supports a duty to explore in
some passages, yet, in other language, it says that a probable profit must be
proven. 67 The language which seems to require proof of a profit is quoted
from Clifton, stating in substance that there is no distinction between exploration and development after production in paying quantities has been ob61.

Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 97, 325 S.W.2d 684, 696 (1959).

62. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Masterson, 271 F.2d 310, 317 (5th Cir. 1959).
63. Id. at 320-21.
64. Id. at 321.
65. Id. at 321.

The court's final decision adopted the trial court's findings and de-

cree which were found wholly justified, and even stated the program of exploration and
development the trial court decreed was characterized by unusual generosity. Id. at 325.
For a discussion of the Masterson case see 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS
LAW § 845.6, at 358-61 (1972).
66. 334 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
67. Meyers & Williams, The Implied Duty to Explore Further: Recent Texas Developments, 41 TExAs L. REV. 789, 800 (1963).
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tained.6 8 The court summarized the requirements of the covenant by holding
that a lessor must prove that the lessee has failed to satisfy the standards
of a prudent operator, that producing horizons existed which should have been
further explored or drilled, and that if such additional wells had been drilled,
there would have been a reasonable expectation of profit to both the lessor
and lessee. 69

This holding might reasonably be interpreted as recognizing two covenants,
exploration and development, with no distinguishing features between the
two, both applying the standard of the prudent operator rule which entails
proof of an expectation of profit. The court also expressly declined to follow
Masterson.70 Williams and Meyers, however, reasonably conclude that the
court's action in declining to follow Masterson did not establish that there
was no duty to drill exploratory wells under any circumstances, but that the
court refused only to treat the two leases in question as one lease since this
71
would have placed an unforeseen burden on the lessee.
Finally, Felmont has been criticized as not shedding any light on the Texas
law concerning implied covenants, and in fact, resulted only in further confusion. Such criticism came about because the writ was returned "no reversible error," meaning the Texas Supreme Court did not disagree with the result of the case, but did not necessarily agree with the reasoning used to reach
the result.

72

68. Felmont Oil Corp. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 334 S.W.2d 449, 455
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
69. Id. at 455.
70. Id. at 458.
71. Meyers and Williams pointed this out indicating that the court in Felmont Oil
was not rejecting the entire reasoning of Masterson. See Meyers & Williams, The Implied Duty to Explore Further: Recent Texas Developments, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 789,
801 (1963). The statement referred to in the opinion reads:

Appellants have called our attention to the recent case of Sinclair Oil &Gas Co.

v. Masterson, 271 F.2d 310, by the Fifth Circuit which case purports to distinguish
and follow the Koontz case. We do not think this case has distinguished the facts
of the Koontz case, nor do we believe it follows it. In the Masterson case, the
court had before it 31 separate oil and gas leases, each entitled to enforcement with
respect to the implied covenants to explore, develop and produce. The court there
declined to enforce the implied covenants imposed by each of the leases, presumably
on the ground that to do so would impose too heavy a burden on the defendant.
Instead, the court treated the 31 separate leases as though they were a single lease
covering 90,000 acres. In the absence of an agreement, or the consent of the parties, we know of no rule by which a Texas court would be authorized to take such
action. We decline to follow the Masterson case.
Felmont Oil Corp. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 334 S.W.2d 449, 458 (Tex. Civ.
App.-E1 Paso 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.). According to Meyers and Williams, this statement by the court indicated its misconception of the Masterson case, for the treatment
of the 31 leases was to decrease the burden on the lessee rather than increase it as the
court of appeals seems to think. Williams & Meyers, The Implied Duty to Explore
Further: Recent Texas Developments, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 789, 801 (1963).
72. Meyers & Williams, The Implied Duty to Explore Further: Recent Texas Developments, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 789, 801 (1963).
For a contrary opinion as to the significance of the writ returned and Felmont Oil's
degree of authority see Smith, Duty to Explore Further: A Disagreement, 42 TEXAS
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,In 1964, the supreme court again returned a writ "no reversible error" in
Edgar v. Southwestern Oil & Refining Co. 73 The suit involved the alleged
breach of a covenant to "reasonably develop" a 2,258 acre lease executed
in 1950. Evidence indicated one well, dually completed at the 9,900 and
10,002 foot levels, had been drilled on the 2,258 acre tract. This well profitably produced gas and associated liquid hydrocarbons at the rate of 500
M.C.F. per day. Other testimony indicated that there were producing wells
at short distances from the lease in question at depths of 11,396 and 11,275
feet, and that another well was being drilled on other land within 2,400 feet
of the northern boundary to the 11,045 foot level all evidencing a productive
pool, oval in shape, covering all of the leased land except the northeast corner. There were affidavits and counter-affidavits by experts as to whether
a prudent operator would have "further developed" these "known" formations and whether there was a reasonable expectation of profit.
Based on 'Clifton the court held that the lessor was entitled to a trial on
the merits. 74 The applicable rules were derived from Clifton and Felmont:
each separate horizon was entitled to separate development, and the burden
rests on the lessor to prove that producing strata, different from those from
which production is being obtained, in reasonable probability exist, and that
by the drilling of additional wells there would be a reasonable expectation
of profit to the lessee. 75 This rather ambiguous language from Clifton illustrates that the supreme court may require further exploration in some circumstances, but only under strict application of the prudent operator standard. It might be noted that Edgar is actually more a "development" case
L. REV. 199, 206-209 (1963).
In Labbe v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 350 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) the court rejected the appellant's contention that under the terms
of the ,lease in question, the lessees were "expressly" required to continue to investigate,
explore, prospect, drill, mine and operate for the production of oil, gas, and all other
minerals on the entire lease. The court quoted from Clifton a statement the substance
of which was that under the terms of the lease, the lessee has the right to explore, but
it does not necessarily follow that the lessee is under a duty to explore. Id. at 877,
quoting Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 98, 325 S.W.2d 684, 696-97 (1959).
See also Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.). This was an action for damages by the lessors of an oil
and gas lease against the lessees for the failure to develop as prudent operators. There
were two reservoirs and the lessees had only produced from the upper stratum. The
court held the ,lessees were not entitled to offset production from the gas reservoir in
the upper sands against production to which lessors were entitled from the lower sands,
and that lessees should have known about the lower sands and developed such sands as
they were separate reservoirs. Id. at 908. The decision upheld a judgment for lessors
for $98,450 (being $73,450 actual damages and $25,000 exemplary damages). Citing
the Clifton case for the applicable rule, the court said, "The duty of lessee to develop,
exists as to each reservoir or stratum which contained sufficient oil and gas to justify
the cost of development." Id. at 908.
73. 377 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
74. Id. at 229.
75. Id. at 228-29.
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than an "exploration" case. The lessor sought development in proven horizons deeper than the existing dual well. In a true "further exploration" case,
the lessor seeks to require the lessee to drill exploratory wells to an untested
horizon because of sufficient circumstances indicating it would be unreason7
able not to explore such zones. 6
Whether the Texas Supreme Court would uphold a true "further exploration" claim is not yet clear. It is arguable that such a claim would receive
support if the court were faced with a factual situation similar to the Masterson case.
FURTHER EXPLORATION COVENANT IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Jurisdictions other than Texas have also been reluctant to expressly recognize a separate and distinct duty to "further explore" as distinguished from
"additional development" after initial production has been achieved. There
have been cases, however, which appear to have impliedly recognized the
duty to further explore in various circumstances under the general covenant
to "fully develop" the leasehold. 77 Other cases have simply intermixed the
terms exploration and development without actually recognizing a different
standard of breach for either. 78 In fact, the reasonable prudent operator
standard is almost uniformly utilized in determining whether a lessee should
either further explore or develop, 79 but the circumstances in which courts are
76. It may be noted that there are two recent cases where Texas courts have recognized a lessee's potential liability for "damages" for the failure to develop each separate,

known horizon in the leasehold.
In Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 405 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968) the lessors brought suit to
recover alleged deficiencies in royalty payments, as well as additional relief on the theory that the leased premises were being drained and had not been properly developed.
After recognizing the existence of the covenants to protect against drainage and to reasonably develop, the court, citing Clifton, held the evidence indicated that "damages"
were the only relief available under the circumstances. Id. at 78. The court relied on
W.T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27 (1929):
The usual remedy for breach of the lessee's implied covenant for reasonable development of oil and gas is an action for damages, though, under extraordinary circumstances-where there can be no other adequate relief-a court of equity will
entertain an action to cancel the lease in whole or in part.
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 405 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966),
rev'd on other grounds, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968). Applying this rule, it was held
that damages were ascertainable for the lessee's failure to develop the lower formation
in dispute and that the trial court had erred in granting a conditional decree. Id. at
79; accord, Shell Oil Co. v. Stanbury, 401 S.W.2d 623, 632 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1966), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 410 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1967) (court recognized lessee's duty to develop and protect premises from drainage as to each reservoir or stratum
or horizon or sand lens containing sufficient oil and gas to invoke such obligations, express or implied).
77. E.g., Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 137 P.2d 934, 938 (Okla. 1943).
78. E.g., Smith v. Moody, 94 S.W.2d 357, 358 (Ark. 1936).
79. E.g., Fischer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 133 P.2d 95, 99 (Kan. 1943); Clifton
v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 98, 325 S.W.2d 684, 697 (1959).
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willing to enforce such duties differ substantially among the states. For instance, some courts appear to emphasize the length of time since the last well
was drilled; 80 some emphasize whether additional drilling would result in a
profit to the lessee; 81 and still others inquire whether other operators are willing to drill on the lease in question; 8 2 however, in most cases, a number of
considerations are combined to indicate a lack of due diligence on the part
of the lessee. Since the action to cancel a lease for the breach of a covenant
is a proceeding in equity, the court should determine whether all the circumstances indicate the lessee has not conducted himself as a reasonable prudent
operator.
Size of the Lease in Relation to Existing Wells
One set of factors which are pertinent to the inquiry is the size of the leasehold in dispute, and the number and location of producing wells in relation
to the tract. Of course Masterson, which involved over ninety thousand
acres, was an extreme example in which the court did enforce a duty to further explore. 83 In another case there had been two producing gas wells
drilled on a 1,263-acre lease, and no steps had been taken to develop the
lease to the north and east of the main fault line where a known horizon
existed.8 4 In still another, a lease was cancelled for the failure to explore
a 120-acre tract on which one well had been drilled in the northwest corner
which produced only 10 to 20 barrels of oil per day.85 In Sauder v. MidContinent Petroleum Corp.,80 the Supreme Court cancelled a lease on which
two offset wells had been drilled on a 40-acre portion of the tract, but there
had been no drilling on the remaining 320 acres. 87 On the other hand, cancellation has been denied where five wells were drilled on a 20-acre tract,
and where of at least 15 wells were drilled to deeper sands on adjacent tracts,
only one had been a dry hole.88 These few cases illustrate a common judicial
attitude that the proportion of the number of wells to the amount of acreage
in the lease is significant in determining the diligence of the operator.
Current Operations
Another factor of considerable importance in further exploration and development cases has been the operator's drilling operations in the lease or
80. E.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Wilson, 215 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1954); Sand
Springs Home v. Clemens, 276 P.2d 262 (Okla. 1954).
81. E.g., Sanders v. Birmingham, 522 P.2d 959, 966 (Kan. 1974); Clifton v.
Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684, 696 (1959).
82. E.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Romero, 194 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1952).
83. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Masterson, 271 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1959).
84. Carter v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 36 So. 2d 26, 27 (La. 1948).
85. Nolan v. Thomas, 309 S.W.2d 727, 728 (Ark. 1958).

86. 292 U.S. 272 (1934).
87. Id. at 276-77.

88. Saulsberry v. Siegel, 252 S.W.2d 834 (Ark. 1952).
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in the immediate vicinity, and the exploratory activity, short of actual drilling, which may indicate reasonable and diligent conduct. An excellent example of such a case was Sun Oil Co. v. Frantz,8 9 decided by the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The lease in question covered three noncontiguous tracts, and the lessee had obtained production on tract one during
the primary term and on tract two during the pendency of the case on appeal.

The court emphasized that the lessor had not been indifferent to the possibilities of development, that it had actively promoted development and had
contributed money and acreage to the full exploration of the leased land's
mineral potential, that there was no reluctance to proceed with exploratory
work, and that the lessee had drilled or participated in the drilling of 20 wells
in the area and was drilling an offset well by tract three at the time of trial. 90
Based on these circumstances, the court refused to cancel the undeveloped
portions of the lease.9 ' Similar cases have indicated a general acceptance

of the principle that geophysical testing and exploratory activity or drilling
in the immediate vicinity of a lease constitutes prudent operation as long'as
there has not been an unreasonable delay in development or exploration of
92
the property.
The Willing Operator
Closely related to the factor of current exploration activities in the area
incorporated in the leasehold is the lessee's refusal to commence additional
drilling in light of testimony from other operators who would be willing to
drill on a lease if cancellation were granted. This factor was emphasized
in the Louisiana case of Carter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. 9 3 which
seems to support an obligation to further explore. There had been two producing gas wells drilled on a 1,263-acre lease, and favorable expert testimony
indicated probable production in a known horizon which existed to the north
and east of an underlying fault. Furthermore, an experienced operator testi89. 291 F.2d 52 (10th Cir. 1961).
90. Id. at 55.
91. Id. at 55; accord, Chenoweth v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 314 F.2d 63
(10th Cir. 1963). See also Shell Oil Co. v. Lee, 258 P.2d 666 (Okla. 1953) (lessee
joined others in a geological survey, drilled 3 different deep test wells at a cost of over
$500,000 on adjacent leaseholds, and one lessee had committed itself to help drill a deep
test well Y4 mile from the lease in question and desired to await the outcome of this
well before drilling on the lessor's property).
92. See Pohlemann v. Stephens Petroleum Co., 197 F.2d 134 (10th Cir. 19,52) (lessee joined other operators in a deep test well); Trust Co. v. Samedan Oil Corp., 192
F.2d 282 (10th Cir. 1951) (lessee made study of possibilities of deeper producing
formations in general area, contributed to cost of deep test well, and planned to drill
deep test well in immediate vicinity of lease in question); Carter Oil Co. v. Mitchell,
100 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1939) (several test wells on adjacent property); Ferguson v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 137 P.2d 940 (Okla. 1943) (lessee joined others in a deep test well
12 mile from the lease in question, and second well was commenced on notice).
93. 36 So. 2d 26 (La. 1948).
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fled that if he owned a lease covering the acreage in question, he would either
drill a well himself or join others to do so. It was the defendant-lessee's contention that under the implied obligations of the lease he was not required
to drill exploratory wells on the undeveloped portion of the tract lying outside the proven field, and that the drilling of any additional wells on the property would constitute exploration and not development.9 4 The lessee had no
present or future plans to drill such exploratory wells. The court cited Brewster and recognized that the reasonable prudent operator rule was the applicable standard, giving due regard for the interest of both contracting parties.9 5
Giving special emphasis to the fact that another operator was willing to drill
additional wells of an exploratory nature, the court held that the lessee had
violated an implied condition of the lease to develop the property prudently
and reasonably.9 6 The court explained,
[t]he principle as we understand it, is that development of every part
of the lease is an implied condition. Therefore, whether the undeveloped portion be a single tract remote from the rest, or a considerable
portion of a very large tract . . .or the east one hundred acres of a tract
of 160, it is an implied condition that the lessee will test every
part. .... 97
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Romero9" was a similar case in which
the Fifth Circuit emphasized the importance of testimony from an experienced operator that he would be ready and willing to lease the plaintiff's
property if the lease were cancelled. 9 The district court had granted cancellation despite testimony that further drilling would be unprofitable, stating
that
[i]n spite of the insistence by defendant's and intervenor's geologists
that no reasonably prudent operator would drill additional wells on the
Romero property, the bald fact remains that plaintiff has an experienced
operator who is willing, ready, and able to drill. .

.

. If the possibility

of producing oil and gas is so remote of what value is the lease? 100
The Fifth Circuit agreed with this reasoning, but required that adequate
assurances be made by the willing operator that he would lease the Romero
property before a conditional decree would become effective.'
This decision has been interpreted as enforcing an implied covenant to further explore
in the broadest sense. 10 2 Romero held that the covenant to further explore
94. id. at 27.
95. Id. at 28.
96. Id. at 29.
97. Id. at 29, quoting Fox Petroleum
(emphasis added).
98. 194 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1952).
99. Id. at 386.
100. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Romero,
101. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Romero,
102. Meyers, The Implied Covenant of
561 (1956).
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93 F. Supp. 117, 119-20 (E.D. La. 1950).
194 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1952).
Further Exploration, 34 TExAs L. REv. 553,
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is breached, not if an ordinary prudent operator would further explore, but
if any operator is willing and able to do so. 10 3 The court not only gave conclusive effect to the testimony of the "willing operator," but also disregarded
such factors as whether there had been an unreasonable delay in development, or whether additional drilling would be economically feasible. 10 4 This
standard is completely contrary to the usual prudent operator rule which is
based on a hypothetical operator, not merely any willing operator who testifies for the lessor. If the Romero standard were applied, it could lead to
collusive or fraudulent practices. Of course testimony from a willing operator
is a relevant factor, but it should not be conclusive, and all surrounding circumstances should be considered.
The Profit Test and Surrounding Circumstances
Perhaps the most important factor considered in further exploration and
development cases has been the economic feasibility of drilling additional
wells on the lease. Obviously, a lessee will always avoid, drilling additional
wells when the geological data and other circumstances indicate such drilling
would result in a loss. The question usually is, under what circumstances,
if any, would a reasonable prudent operator drill despite the possibility of
a loss in profits?
,Ina Kansas case, Fischer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 105 the main issue
presented was whether or not an expectation of profit was an essential element of the reasonable prudent operator standard. 10 6 It was held that a
profit was essential, reasoning that the large expense incident to exploration
and development justifies the lessee in proceeding with reasonable caution
07
and with a proper regard for his own interest as well as that of the lessor.1
Such proof of a profit would be necessary even when drilling would result
in some profit to the lessor.' 08
Harris v. Morris Plan Co.'0 9 is a Kansas decision which seems to have recognized that proof of a profit may not be absolutely necessary when other
circumstances favor additional drilling. The lease in question contained 200
acres on which there was one well which was capable of extracting oil from
a 600 square foot area. The lessee evidenced an intention not to further
develop the lease until the price of oil reached a certain level and contended
there could 'be no cancellation unless the lessor proved additional wells would
result in a mutual advantage. The court held that the element of profit
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
(1959).

Id. at 561-62.
Id. at 562.
133 P.2d 95 (Kan. 1943).
id. at 99.
Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 99-100; accord, Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 98, 325 S.W.2d 684, 697

109. 61 P.2d 901 (Kan. 1936).
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would not be considered separately from the main context of the prudent op:
erator rule.110 It was explained that the rule could not be read to mean that
unless the operation is profitable to the lessee, he need not develop, but that
actions of this sort are equitable in nature, and equitable principles must be
applied. 11 Since the lessee was undoubtedly holding the lease for specula112
tive purposes only, the lease was cancelled as to the undeveloped portion.
The recent case of Sanders v. Birmingham" leaves little room for doubt
as to what circumstances in conjunction with the profit test will be considered
in the state of Kansas. Generally, all of the facts and circumstances which
would affect the reasonableness of an ordinary prudent operator's position in
connection with development of the lease will be considered. 1 4 More specifically, the pertinent factors for consideration are (1) the quantity of the oil
or gas capable of being produced as indicated by prior exploration and development, (2) the local market, (3) the extent of operations on adjacent
tracts, (4) the character of the reservoir, and (5) the usages of the business. 115 Economic factors to be considered are the total cost of operation,
the cost of transportation and storage, and the general market as influenced
by supply and demand or by governmental regulation." 6
In the Arkansas case of Smith v. Moody,"17 the court placed little emphasis
on the economic feasibility of additional wells when 11 years had elapsed
since the last well had been drilled.:"" Concerning the lessee's contention
that additional wells would be unprofitable, the court said, "If true, the lessees have not been damaged by the cancellation of so much of the contract
of lease as cannot be profitably performed."" 9 'In a more recent case, however, the Arkansas Supreme Court has placed greater emphasis on economic
factors.120 The purpose of the suit was to cancel 120 acres of a 200-acre
lease consisting of five contiguous 40-acre tracts. Seven wells had been
drilled to the deepest "known" horizon at a cost to the lessees of approximately $369,648; and it was conceded that the tract had been fully developed
to the known horizons. The lessors alleged the "deeper" horizons (below
the 3,500 foot level) constituted separate estates which the lessee had failed
to explore and that he was holding such acreage for speculative purposes
110. Id. at 905.
111. Id. at 905.

112. Id. at 905; accord, Vonfeldt v. Hanes, 414 P.2d 7, 11 (Kan. 1966); Renner v.
Monsanto Chem. Co., 354 P.2d 326, 334 (Kan. 1960).
113. 522 P.2d 959 (Kan. 1974).
114. Id. at 966.

115. Id. at 966.
116. Id. at 966.

117. 94 S.W.2d 357 (Ark. 1936).

118. Id. at 358.

119. Id. at 358; accord, Skelly Oil Co. v. Scoggins, 329 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Ark.
1959).
120. Reynolds v. Smith, 331 S.W.2d 112, 116 (Ark. 1960).
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only. There was uncontradicted testimony that the drilling of such a deep
well would be a wildcat operation since the nearest deeper production was
9 miles to the southeast, and 16 miles to the southwest. It was also shown
that such an exploratory well would cost between $40,000 and $70,000 and
that to warrant drilling, a minimum of 500 acres would be necessary in order
to justify the expenditure.
The court held that a reasonable prudent operator dealing with the leased
premises, including the deeper formations, and giving due regard for the interests of both parties, would not have explored further. 12 1 The reasons
given were that the express provisions of the lease did not contemplate drilling to deeper formations; there was no proof that other operators were willing
to drill to deeper sands on the lease in question or in the vicinity; and finally,
testimony indicated a prudent operator would not drill such a deep test well
unless there were at least 500 acres to justify the expense. 122 This case not
only illustrates that Arkansas courts consider the profit test important, it also
indicates a willingness to cancel the undeveloped portions of a lease for a
failure to "further explore," as distinguished from additional development in
a proven formation, where circumstances would justify such exploratory activity.
Kentucky, and some other jurisdictions, has emphasized the economic feasibility of additional wells by comparing the rate of return on existing wells
with the prospects of commercial production on surrounding acreage.' 23 For
instance in McMahan v. Boggess,124 there had been only one well drilled on

a 3-acre lease at a cost of $22,000 and a return of only $7,000. The lease
was cancelled, however, because of an unreasonable delay in further development and because of expert testimony that the prospects of commercial pro25
duction would justify additional wells.'
In the light of these decisions, it might be reasonably concluded that proof
of an expectation of profit to the lessee is of considerable importance in determining whether an operator has acted prudently. When such proof is
lacking, however, other circumstances such as prolonged and unreasonable
delay in further development or exploration, favorable exploratory activity
in the immediate vicinity, or other willing operators may result in a judgment
for the lessor. Thus, failure to meet the profit test should not be the sole
and exclusive factor, but all circumstances should be considered with regard
to both parties' interests.
121. Id. at 116.
122. Id. at 116.

123. E.g., Gregory v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 261 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Ky. 1953).
124. 302 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1957).
125. Id. at 593-94; accord, Gregory v.
1953). In Gregory the cost of the only
$4,662. This loss of profits plus the fact
tracts led to a holding which adjudged the
erator. Id. at 625.

Sohio Petroleum Co., 261 S.W.2d 623 (Ky.
well was $10,747 and the return was only
that there were 14 dry holes on 3 adjoining
lessee had acted as a reasonable prudent op-
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UnreasonableDelay and Burden of Proof
An unreasonable delay in exploration or development is usually strong evidence that the lessee is holding the undeveloped portions of his lease for speculative purposes only. Most important, such a delay in drilling has affected
a lessor's burden of proving the lessee has not acted as a reasonable prudent
operator in many decisions. 12 The leading case in this area is Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 1 2 7 decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The suit
was to cancel the undeveloped portion of two producing oil and gas leases,
on which no wells had been drilled for 14 years. There were six producers
on a 40-acre lease and ten producers on a 100-acre lease. The defendant
alleged it had acted as a reasonable prudent operator as the circumstances
did not indicate further drilling would be a profitable venture and that it ex12 s
pected to drill in the future when circumstances warranted it.
There was
no effort made to prove that additional wells could be drilled with a reasonable expectation of profit, and the issue clearly was whether the lessor
could still be granted a cancellation decree.2 9 It was held that relief should
be granted under the theory of a breach of the implied covenant to "fully
develop."'3 0 In establishing the covenant to fully develop, the court held that
[t]o permit the lessee to hold the lease for an unreasonable length of
time for merely speculative purposes, is to allow him to protect his own
interest and to disregard the interest of the lessor. If conditions do not
indicate to him that further development will be profitable, it is but fair
that, after a reasonable time has expired, he surrender the undeveloped
portions of the lease and allow the lessor to procure development by
others or assume the burden of showing why in equity and good conscience the undeveloped portion should not be cancelled.... 131
Based on this principle, the court held that a 14-year delay was an unreasonable time under the circumstances, and in the absence of proof by the lessee showing special circumstances justifying the nondevelopment, the lessor
8 2
was entitled to relief.'
126. E.g., Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 137 P.2d 934, 938 (Okla. 1943).
Contra, Sanders v. Birmingham, 522 P.2d 959, 965-66 (Kan. 1974); Fischer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 133 P.2d 95, 100 (Kan. 1943).
127. 137 P.2d 934 (Okla. 1943).

128. Evidence also indicated that it was customary to drill on each 2
there were 29 untested sites on the 2 leases in question.
129. Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 137 P.2d 934, 935 (Okla. 1943).

acres and

130. Id. at 938.
131. Id. at 938 (emphasis added).

132. Id. at 939. The following cases hold that an unreasonable length of time had

occurred: Sparks v. Midstates Oil Corp., 251 F.2d 71, 72 (10th Cir. 1958); Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Wilson, 215 F.2d 317, 319 (10th Cir. 1954); Gregg v. Harper-Turner
Oil Co., 199 F.2d 1, 4 (10th Cir. 1952); Dixon v. Anadarko Prod. Co., 505 P.2d 1394,
1396 (Okla. 1972); Carter v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 485 P.2d 748,
753 (Okla. 1971); Producers Pipe & Supply Co. v. James, 332 P.2d 958, 959 (Okla.
1958); Lyons v. Robson, 330 P.2d 593, 596 (Okla. 19,58); Wolfson Oil Co. v. Gill, 309

P.2d 282, 285 (Okla. 1957); Colpitt v. Tull, 228 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Okla. 1950).
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In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Rockhold,133 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
re-emphasized that an unreasonable delay in development creates a prima
facie case against a lessee, shifting the burden to the lessee to prove that the
mineral estate has been developed in a reasonably prudent manner. 13 4 Thus,
an unreasonable delay, standing alone, creates a rebuttable presumption that
the lessee has breached the implied covenant to fully develop, and the lessee
must then provide evidence sufficient to prove he has acted as a reasonable
prudent operator. One opinion has described the effect of an unreasonable
delay, saying that
after the passage of a reasonable length of time the duty to drill additional wells becomes progressively greater, and the standard of the prudent operator becomes progressively
of less importance in determining
13 5
whether such duty exists.
Such a presumption has been the basis for cancellation even in further exploration cases, where the lessee has allegedly failed to test deeper and unproven formations, and the lessor has not shown an expectation of profit.lse
There have been several good examples in which the defendant-lessee has
produced sufficient evidence to rebut the prima facie case established by the
lessor. Trawick v. Castleberry3 7 was a suit for cancellation of that part of
an oil and gas lease not included within a communitization agreement. After
holding that the primary term had been extended by production on land
within the unit, the court considered the plaintiff's contention that the lease
should be forfeited because the lessees were not diligent in developing it.
The following cases hold that the lessee had sustained the burden of showing special
circumstances which excused non-development: Chenoweth v. Pan American Petroleum
Corp., 314 F.2d 63, 65-66 (10th Cir. 1963); Sun Oil Co. v. Frantz, 291 F.2d 52, 55
(10th Cir. 1961); Union Oil Co. v. Jackson, 489 P.2d 1073, 1077-78 (Okla. 1971); Trawick v. Castleberry, 275 P.2d 292, 295 (Okla. 1953).

133. 138 P.2d 809 (Okla. 1943).

134. id. at 810-11.
135. McKenna v. Nichols, 145 P.2d 957, 960 (Okla. 1944).
136. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Wilson, 215 F.2d 317, 319 (10th Cir. 1954) (delay of 26 years held to be prima facie breach of a lessee to explore deeper sands); Dixon
v. Anadarko Prod. Co., 505 P.2d 1394, 1394-96 (Okla. 1972) (prima facie breach in
failing to drill to deeper horizons and it was not necessary to prove that drilling would
produce sufficient amount of oil or gas to repay cost of drilling, equipping, and operating the well); McKenna v. Nichols, 145 P.2d 957, 960-61 (Okla. 1944) (unreasonable
delay supported conditional cancellation decree requiring lessee to drill to deeper sands
within 60 days despite lack of any expectation of profit).
See also Sand Springs Home v. Clemens, 276 P.2d 262, 263 (Okla. 1954) (nondevelopment for over 12 years held unreasonable); Colpitt v. Tull, 228 P.2d 1000, 1003
(Okla. 1950) (only one well had been drilled on an 80-acre lease 20 years prior to suit,
such delay obviated the necessity of proving additional wells would be profitable); Morrison v. Johnson, 185 P.2d 208, 210 (Okla. 1947) (unreasonable delay plus no intention
to further develop unless other operators joined or assisted financially, lease partially
cancelled excepting area around only one gas producer); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Vaughn, 161 P.2d 762, 765 (Okla. 1945) (one well drilled on a 130-acre tract did not
excuse the lessee from exploring and developing a 70-acre tract for over 28 years).
137. 275 P.2d 292, 293 (Okla. 1953).
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Recognizing the rulings of Doss and Rockhold, and granting for purposes of
argument that an unreasonable length of time had passed without the drilling
of additional wells, it was held that the lessors were, nevertheless, not entitled to relief. 18 8 The court's reasons for this conclusion included (1) uncontradicted testimony to the effect that a well drilled on the northwest quarter
of the southeast quarter had not paid itself out, (2) that several dry holes
had been drilled in the immediate vicinity of the lease, and (3) experts testified that additional wells on the lease in question would not be profitable. 139
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reached a similar result in Sun
Oil Co. v. Frantz. 40 There the lease covered three noncontiguous tracts, and
the lessee had obtained production on tract one during the primary term and
on tract two during the pendency of the case on appeal. The court emphasized that the lessee had not been indifferent to the possibilities of development, that it had actively promoted development and had contributed money
and acreage to the full exploration of the leased land's mineral potential, that
there was no reluctance to proceed with exploratory work, there had been
only a 2 year delay, and that the lessee had drilled or participated in the
drilling of 20 wells in the area and was drilling an offset well by tract three
at the time of trial.14 ' Based on these circumstances, the court refused to
cancel the undeveloped portions of the lease. 142
From these cases it could be concluded that although Oklahoma may not
expressly recognize development and exploration as two separate and independent covenants with two corresponding standards of conduct, it does rec138. Id. at 295.
139. Id. at 295; accord, Union Oil Co. v. Jackson, 489 P.2d 1073, 1075-76 (Okla.
1971) (drilling operations by lessee defined field limit, and lessee showed its continued
efforts and imminent possibility of developing undeveloped portion; court held there had
been no breach and reversed a cancellation decree); Texas Consol. Oils v. Vann, 258
P.2d 679, 690 (Okla. 1953) (delay of 7 years was held not unreasonable and therefore
lessor still had burden of proving a reasonable prudent operator would have drilled and
that there was an expectation of profits); Skelly Oil Co. v. Boles, 142 P.2d 969, 97071 (Okla. 1943) (evidence showed lessee was investigating the possibility of deeper
sands and negotiating with other operators for purposes of sharing expenses; court recognized the Doss rule but denied relief under the circumstances).
In Ferguson v. Gulf Oil Corp., 137 P.2d 940 (Okla. 1943) there were 4 producers
drilled during the primary term of a 160-acre lease, a test well was drilled one-half mile
north of the lease at 8,105 feet which initially produced 3,309 barrels per day, a second
deep test well was drilled one-half mile northwest of the lease which was a dry hole
at 7,497 feet. Other test wells were drilled showing a sharp decline of the deep sands
to the west of the first deep well, and the lessor's land was possibly on the western edge
of the producing area. The court cited Doss and held it would be inequitable to cancel
the lease under these circumstances noting that partial cancellation was not sought. Id.
at 941-43.
140. 291 F.2d 52 (10th Cir. 1961).
141. Id. at 55.
142. Id. at 55; accord, Chenoweth v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 314 F.2d 63,
65 (10th Cir. 1963). There was a dissent in Frantz which agreed with a cancellation
decree issued by the district court.
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ognize that a lessee must do both in order to "fully develop" a lease. It
has even been held in Oklahoma that such an obligation extends to untested,
deeper formations and if there has been an unreasonable delay in developing
143
these formations, then a lessor need not prove an expectation of profit.
A similar approach has been utilized by the Arkansas Supreme Court in
Nolan v. Thomas, 44 in which cancellation was sought on the theory of a
breach of the implied covenant to develop, although the technical basis of
the cause of action was a refusal to "further explore.' 145 The lessee urged
that the lessor had the burden of proving that a prudent operator would have
46
drilled additional wells, and that the lessor failed to meet such burden.
The court rejected this contention holding that the lessor had made a prima
facie case requiring the lessee-defendants to go forward and offer their proof

on the prudent operator rule when it was shown
(1) that the leases here involved were executed in 1944 and allowed
delay rentals to be paid each year for ten (10) years;
(2) that the delay rentals were paid and no drilling was undertaken
on the lease until 1954, when one well was drilled and was a small producer;
(3) that the plaintiffs then insisted for more than two years that the
defendants should drill other wells;
(4) that the defendants consistently refused to drill other wells; and
(5) that the plaintiffs are not asking that the lease be cancelled on
the 40 acres on which there is a producing well,47but are asking for cancellation only on the other three 40-acre tracts.'
This reasoning is comparable to the Oklahoma approach in that the Arkansas
court accepted the notion that after an unreasonable delay in development
or exploration, a lessee should have the burden of presenting evidence sufficient to prove he has acted as a reasonable prudent operator. 48
An analogous approach was taken by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in
143. E.g., Dixon v. Anadarko Prod. Co., 505 P.2d 1394, 1394-96 (Okla. 1972).
144. 309 S.W.2d 727 (Ark. 1958).
145. Id. at 728. In Nolan, the lessor sued to cancel a 120-acre tract which had been
leased in 1944 for a 10-year primary term. At the end of the primary term, a well was
drilled in the northwest corner of the tract which produced only 10 to 20 barrels per
day and there was an express intention not to drill any additional wells or further explore.
146. Id. at 729.
147. Id. at 729.
148. It is also of special importance to point out that the court in Nolan cited Sauder
approvingly and adopted language which read:
The production of oil on a small portion of the leased tract cannot justify the
lessee's holding the balance indefinitely and depriving the lessor, not only of the
expected royalty from production pursuant to the lease, but of the privilege of making some other arrangement for availing himself of the mineral content of the land.
Nolan v. Thomas, 309 S.W.2d 727, 731 (Ark. 1958); accord, Ezzell v. Oil Associates,
22 S.W.2d 101.5, 1018 (Ark. 1930); Drummond v. Alphin, 4 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Ark.
1928).
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Cameron v. Lebow. 149 Even though the lease was not cancelled on an implied covenant theory, an unexplained failure to achieve some commercial
development for a long period of time was held to be strong evidence of

"abandonment."' 15 0 This conclusion was fortified by two factors: that after
one attempt to drill proved nonproductive, an assignee had made no further

effort to discover oil or gas, and that the court favored a policy against holding a lease for speculative purposes. 151 Thus in Kentucky, while an unreasonable delay in development would raise a presumption of abandonment as
distinguished from a breach of covenant, the basis for both approaches seems

to be the same-a strong public policy against holding potentially producing
leases for speculative purposes, not only depriving the lessor of capital, but
also depriving the public at large of the available resources.' 5 2 The main
difference is that abandonment would preclude any type of equitable conditional cancellation because in such a case the lessee's rights actually terminate
before his case is tried.
A

PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR THE CLIFTON V. KOONTZ DILEMMA

The above cases from major oil and gas producing states illustrate the different factors, approaches, and standards for breach used in resolving litigation dealing with development and further exploratory activity. It is arguable that although there is no present case authority expressly recognizing
Professor Meyers' theory that a distinction should be made between development and further exploration, the cases seem to recognize a duty both
to develop and to explore under the general covenant to "fully develop" the
lease. 153 The majority standard in determining whether a lessee has
breached this covenant is the reasonable prudent operator rule. 5 The problem, then, is whether the prudent operator rule should be liberally adhered
to when the claim is an alleged breach of the duty to further explore. In
particular, should the test in all circumstances be an expectation of profit?
In Clifton v. Koontz,' 5 5 the Texas Supreme Court held that the covenant
of "development" covers all additional drilling requirements after production
149. 338 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 366 S.W.2d 164 (Ky.

1963).

150. Id. at 407.
151. Id. at 407; accord, Wheeler & Lemaster Oil & Gas Co. v. Henley, 398 S.W.2d
475, 477 (Ky. 1965); Sapp v. Massey, 358 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Ky. 1962). See also
Smyth v. Koplin, 294 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1956) (lessee held to have "abandoned" the un-

developed portion of a lease because of a lack of production for 8 years).
152. See Wheeler & Lemaster Oil & Gas Co. v. Henley, 398 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Ky.

1968); Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 137 P.2d 934, 938 (Okla. 1943).
153. See Smith v. Moody, 94 S.W.2d 357, 358 (Ark. 1936); Fischer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 133 P.2d 95, 100 (Kan. 1943); Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 137

P.2d 934, 938 (Okla. 1943).
154. See Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th Cir. 1905).
155. 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).
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is once obtained on the lease. 156 The court also rejected Professor Meyers'
theory that a lessor need not prove an expectation of profit when the alleged
breach is a failure to further explore, and stated that proof of profit was an
essential element of the prudent operator rule. 15 7 It was recognized in Clifton, however, that the court was not faced with a situation in which the lessee
held a large number of acres and in which an unreasonably long time had
elapsed since any development had occurred. 158 This language can be interpretated to mean that when the Texas Supreme Court is faced with such a
situation, the prudent operator rule might be liberally construed in order to
prevent a lessee from holding a large lease for speculative purposes only.
A solution to this situation would be for the Texas Supreme Court to adopt
the Oklahoma approach illustrated in the leading case of Doss Oil Royalty
Co. v. Texas Co.' 59 Doss involved a situation where the lessee attempted
to hold a lease without having drilled additional wells for over 14 years. The
lessee alleged that it had acted as a reasonable prudent operator because the
circumstances did not indicate further drilling would be profitable, but that
it expected to drill some time in the future when circumstances warranted
it. Based on a strong public policy against holding leases for speculative purposes only, the court granted cancellation.' 60 The approach utilized by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in reaching this result was that once a lessee is
found to be holding property and there has been an unreasonable length of
time since the last well was drilled, then a prima facie case or presumption
arises that the lessee is holding the lease for speculation and therefore has
breached his implied covenant to fully develop.' 6 ' When this presumption
is employed, the lessor is relieved of the burden of proving that additional
wells could be drilled with a reasonable expectation of profit.1 62 The burden
shifts to the lessee to prove he has acted as a prudent operator, and one element of such proof would include testimony that further drilling would not
be profitable. 163 As illustrated in Oklahoma cases, there have been many
instances where a lessee has in fact rebutted the presumption that he has
64
breached the implied covenant to fully develop.'
The use of a presumption where there has been an unreasonable delay
in development is also found in the Kentucky cases.' 6 5 The Kentucky approach differs from Oklahoma in that the effect of such an unreasonable de156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 97, 325 S.W.2d at 696.
Id. at 98, 325 S.W.2d at 697.
Id. at 97, 325 S.W.2d at 696.
137 P.2d 934 (Okla. 1943).
Id. at 939.
Id. at 938-39.
Id. at 938-39.
Id. at 939.
E.g., Trawick v. Castleberry, 275 P.2d 292, 295 (Okla. 1953).
Cameron v. Lebow, 338 S.W.2d 399, 407 (Ky. 1960).
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lay is to evidence abandonment of the undeveloped portions of the leasehold. 166 The use of such a theory in Texas would create a legal fiction because an oil and gas lease in Texas is a determinable fee estate and a corporeal interest in real property. 167 Only incorporeal interests such as easements or a profit a prendre are subject to abandonment, whereas a corporeal
interest in real property is not subject to abandonment regardless of non-use
or the intent of the owner.' 6 8
A third jurisdiction which utilizes a presumption of breach where there is
an unreasonable delay in development is Arkansas. 69 Such an approach
by the Arkansas Supreme Court should be influential in Texas courts because
Arkansas also considers an oil and gas lease a corporeal interest in real
property; 70 therefore, the basic policy considerations inherent in the classification of the lease should be similar.
A basic principle underlying the Oklahoma approach as established in Doss
is the policy against holding leases for speculative purposes only. The entire purpose of an implied covenant to drill additional wells after initial production has been achieved is to promote diligent exploration and development. This is not to say that the courts should not recognize a lessee's right
to speculate during the primary term of the lease. Where the parties bargain
for the payment of delay rentals during the primary term in order to defer
the drilling of an initial well, speculation is exactly what they are bargaining
for. This period of the lease exists to allow the lessee enough time to explore the lease and determine whether it would be economically feasible to
develop it. But, this right to hold the lease for speculative purposes should
be limited to the primary term in order to comply with the 'purposes of the
lease.
Once there has been an unreasonable delay in development during
the secondary term of the lease, it should be presumed that the lessee is holding
the undeveloped portions thereof for purely speculative reasons; therefore,
the lessee should be the party who has the burden of proving he has fully
developed the lease as a reasonable prudent operator would have done. This
burden would entail a showing that the lessee has not only drilled to proven
166. Compare id. at 407 with Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 137 P.2d 934, 93839 (Okla. 1943).
167. See Texas Co. v. Davis, 113 Tex. 321, 254 S.W. 304 (1923); Humphreys-Mexia
Co. v. Gammon, 113 Tex. 247, 254 S.W. 296 (1923); Thomason v. Ham, 113 Tex. 239,
254 S.W. 316 (1923); Robinson v. Jacobs, 113 Tex. 231, 254 S.W. 309 (1923); Stephens
County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923). These cases
were all decided the same day and the opinions were written by Justice Greenwood who
firmly established the view that an oil and gas lease in Texas is a determinable fee estate
and a corporeal interest in real property. See also Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex.
226, 176 S.W. 717 (1915).
168. See Gerhard v. Stephens, 442 P.2d 692, 704-12 (Cal. 1968).
169. Nolan v. Thomas, 309 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Ark. 1958).
170. Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode, 254 S.W. 345, 347 (Ark. 1923).
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formations, but also those untested areas of the lease in which a reasonable
prudent operator would test considering all the circumstances.
The adoption of the Oklahoma approach would not be entirely foreign to
Texas precedent, especially since the standard retained in such an approach
is the prudent operator rule so rigidly followed in Texas. 171 Second, Texas
cases have illustrated a long standing public policy against speculation which
is at the heart of the proposed Oklahoma approach. In Texas Co. v.
Davis,' 72 decided in 1923, the court terminated a lease which under the habendum clause was to continue for at least 25 years after the discovery of
oil or gas. Justice Greenwood supported this holding, stating:
The lessees in that case contended that by completing the first well,
producing oil in paying quantities, in accordance with the stipulation in
the lease, they acquired an absolute vested title to the oil, of which they
could be divested save by reconveyance, etc. It was decided that on
completion of the well the lessees did take title to the oil. But, in denying that the lessees could refuse performance of their obligations and
continue to hold or own the oil, it is said, with irrefutable logic:

There is no case which goes so far as to announce that after mere
discovery of oil, the lessee, upon the assumption of a vested interest or

title, may cease operation, refuse to develop the property, tie up the oil
or to await his
by his lease and simply hold it for speculative
73 purposes,
own pleasure as to the time of development.

This policy against speculation was again applied by the Texas Supreme
Court in Garcia v. King,' 74 holding that the term "produced" found in a
thereafter clause is equivalent to the phrase "produced in paying quantities:"7,

So far as the lessees were concerned, the object in providing for a
continuation of the lease for an indefinite time after the expiration of
the primary period was to allow the lessees to reap the full fruits of the
investments made by them in developing the property. Obviously, if the

lease could no longer be operated at a profit, there were no fruits for
them to reap. The lessors should not be required to suffer a continuation of the lease after the expiration of the primary period merely for
speculative purposes on the part of the lessees. Since the lease was no

longer yielding a profit to the lessees at the termination of the primary
period, the object sought to be accomplished
76 by the continuation thereof
had ceased, and the lease had terminated.'
This holding clearly illustrates a policy against speculation after the primary term has ended, which supports the basic purpose of the presumption
171.
172.
173.
Co., 42
174.
175.
176.

Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 96, 325 S.W.2d 684, 695 (1959).
113 Tex. 321, 254 S.W. 304 (1923).
Id. at 333-34, 254 S.W. at 308, quoting Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas
S.E. 655, 658 (W. Va. 1902) (emphasis added).
139 Tex. 578, 164 S.W.2d 509 (1942).
Id. at 581-85, 164 S.W.2d at 512-13.
Id. at 585-86, 164 S.W.2d at .512-13 (emphasis added).
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that a lessee has breached his implied covenant to diligently drill additional
wells when there is proof of an unreasonable delay in development.
Finally, in cases where the rights of the general public are concerned, public policy should be considered in reaching an equitable decision. This is especially true where there is an allegation that a lessee has failed to fully develop an oil and gas lease. This public policy is the promotion of further
exploratory and/or additional development of oil and gas leases in order to
benefit not only the lessor's private interest, but also to place all potentially
producing reservoirs within the market place. The more domestic reserves
which are discovered, the less the public will have to depend on foreign countries for oil. It has been said that this public policy is reflected in the intangible drilling deductions in federal income tax law, the discovery allowables
1 77
in state conservation regulations, and the restrictions on imported oil.
Of course public policy should not require a lessee to drill additional wells
in a "proven" horizon where there is no expectation of profit. The purpose
of an implied covenant is not to facilitate bankruptcy. The purpose should
be to require a lessee to diligently prosecute exploratory and/or development
wells which the lessor, courts and public expect a reasonable prudent operator
would drill under all the circumstances. When a lessee has failed to fully
develop a lease as a prudent operator, and is holding those undeveloled portions of a lease for speculative purposes, he has the duty to release this
undeveloped land so others may have the opportunity to market available
reserves. It is only fair that after an unreasonable length of time has elapsed
since any effort to further develop or explore the lease has occurred, the lessee should bear the burden of proving he has indeed fully developed the lease
as a reasonable prudent operator.
An excellent case in which the Oklahoma approach could have been utilized was Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Masterson.17 1 The suit involved the allegation that the lessee had failed to develop and explore portions of a lease
covering ninety thousand acres. The court laudibly found that the delay in
development and exploration for over 25 years was unreasonable, and held
that the lessors need not prove additional drilling Would be profitable in order
to obtain relief.' 79 If the court had followed the Oklahoma approach established in Doss, such an unreasonable delay in exploration and development
would have created a presumption that a breach of the implied covenant to
further develop had occurred, thereby relieving the lessor from the burden
of proving an expectation of profit.
177. See 5 H. WILLIAMs & C. MEYERS,
178.

OIL AND GAS LAw

§ 802.2, at 12 (1972).

271 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1959).

179, id, at 321.
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